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How Burdensome are Capital Gains Taxes?
ABSTRACT
Several recent and provocative studies have described portfolio trading
strategies which permit investors to avoid all taxes on capital gains and to
shelter a substantial part of their ordinary income as well. Other studies
adopt the more traditional view that the capital gains tax raises the effective
tax burden on capital income. This paper uses capital gain realization data
from the 1982 IRS Individual Tax Model in an effort to distinguish between these
views. It shows that for about one-fifth of the investors who realize gains or
losses, the ordinary income loss—offset limitations are binding constraints.
Since additional gain realizations do not affect these investors' current tax
liability, they may be effectively untaxed on capital gains. Another signifi-
cant group escapes taxation by not reporting realized gains. However, the
largest group of investors trades in a less elaborate and more honest manner,
realizing and reporting gains without offsetting losses. The capital gains tax






(617) 253—6673Traditional analyses of the capital gains tax focus on threetypes of
investment distortions. First, the "lock-in effect," which arises becausegains
are taxed on realization rather than accrual, may lead investors to hold
incompletely diversified portfolios. Second, risk-taking decisionsmay be
distorted by the limited loss offset provisions, and other changes in the risk--
return opportunity set, associated with the tax. Third, the taxmay distort
savings decisions by affecting the after-tax return which investors earn on
appreciating assets. 1
Empirical studies of capital gains taxation typically center on estimating
the effective tax rate under simple assumptions about theway investors manage
their portfolios. They focus on the importance of deferral and non-taxation of
gains at death in reducing the capital gains tax burden. These studies usually
find that because average asset holding periods are quite long, the effective
capital gains tax rate is only a fraction of the statutory rate.2
An alternative view of the capital gains tax with radically different
implications both for analyzing distortions and for measuring effective tax
rates has recently been advanced by Allen (1982), Constantinides (1983, 1984),
and Stiglitz (1983). These authors recognize that by adopting appropriate
portfolio strategies, investors can avoid paying capital gains tax. With
perfect capital markets and no transactions costs, the current United States
tax code permits an investor to shelter not just his capital income, but his
ordinary income as well. By using one set of securities transactions, investors
can transform ordinary income into capital gains; a second set of transactions
will enable them to defer realization of taxable gains. In principle, the
second step can be repeated until assets with accrued gains are bequeathed,—2—
escaping capital gains taxation entirely. Although few investors may actually
behave as this "tax minimizing" view suggests, the new analysis emphasizes that
the impact of the capital gains tax depends upon the constraints or market im-
perfections which prevent investors from following tax-minimizing trading rules.
This paper investigates the empirical importance of investors whose
trading strategies lead them to face zero marginal tax rates on realized
gains. It suggests that a large part of the investing public does not engage
in tax-minimizing portfolio transactions, but behaves in a fashion more accura-
tely characterized by the traditional view. This finding informs the debate on
the economic effects of capital gains taxation, and raises the more general
question of why households do act to minimize their tax liabilities.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first describes the
detailed provisions of the U.S. tax code affecting capital gains, and sketches
the tax-minimizing trading rules examined in previous studies. The second
section estimates the distribution of statutory marginal tax rates on realized
gains, and examines the fraction of realized gains which are offset by capital
losses. Evidence that a large fraction of investors face marginal tax rates of
zero, or that a large share of realized gains are offset by losses, would sup-
port the "tax minimizing" view. The third section questions previous evidence
on the significance of tax-induced distortions in asset holding periods. The
fourth section discusses several omissions stemming from my focus on realized
gains, and the conclusion suggests a number of directions for future research.—3-
I. The Structure of Capital Gains Taxes
Each investor's marginal tax rate on realized gains is a complicated func—
tion of his realized short—term and long-term gains and losses. The applicable
tax rate ranges between zero and the ordinary income tax rate, depending on the
configuration of realized gains. The principal difficulty in analyzing capital
gains taxation is the endogeneity of the very transactions which constitute the
tax base. Different assumptions about investors' trading rules imply different
effective capital gains tax rates. The first half of this section outlines the
statutory provisions which determine an investor's marginal tax rate on realized
gains. The second half sketches how different assumptions about investor beha-
vior affect the marginal tax rate on realized gains, and identifies their
empirical predictions.
l.A. The Legal Framework
There are four provisions -in the U.S. tax code as of 1982 which must be
considered in determining an investor's statutory tax rate on realized capital
gains:3
(i) Short—term and long—term gains are treated differently. Gains and
losses on assets which have been held for less than one year are considered
short—term.4 Forty percent of net long-term gains and all net short-term gains
are included in an investor's taxable income.
(ii) Short-term losses offset long—term gains dollar—for-dollar, and
long-term losses offset a short-term gains dollar-for-dollar.
(iii) After gains have been used to offset losses, an investor with a net
long-term loss may deduct one-half of the loss from ordinary income. If there-4-
is a net short—term loss, the full amount is deducted. However, no more than
$3,000 of ordinary income may be offset by capital losses in any tax year. This
limit is $1,500 for married taxpayers filing separately. Capital losses in
excess of the loss-offset limits may be carried forward indefinitely.
(iv) When an investor dies and bequeathes assets to his heirs, the tax
basis of the transferred assets is raised to their current market value. Accrued
gains on assets transferred this way avoid capital gains taxation entirely.5
Figure 1 shows how the first three provisions interact to determine the
statutory tax rates on long-term and short-term realized gains. The investor's
net short-term capital gain (Ns) is plotted on the vertical axis, while the
horizontal axis shows the net long-term gain (NL). The line NL + = 0 divides
the plane into two regions, indicating the presence of a net gain or net loss.
Realizations above this line generate net capital gains, while those below it
correspond to net losses. The other line depicts the loss-offset constraint.
It represents the points at which net short-term losses plus one-half of net
long-term losses equal $3,000. For an investor whose losses exceed this limit,
i.e., one whose realizations lie below this line, marginal losses have no effect
on current tax liability. They must be carried forward.
The net loss and loss-offset lines combine with the axes to divide the
figure into seven different regions with different pairs of tax rates (Ts,TL) on
realized short-term and long-term gains. In Region I, the investor realizes
both net long-term and net short—term gains. His capital gains tax liability is
T*(Ns + .4NL). where T is his marginal tax rate on ordinary income. His margi-
nal tax rate on realized long-term gains is therefore TL =.4T,while that on
short-term gains is =T.Most studies of effective capital gains tax rates—5—
























assume that investors who realize gains face the tax rates in this region.
An investor in Region II realizes net long-term losses which are smaller in
absolute value than his short-term gains. The losses offset the gains dollar-
for-dollar yielding a net gain of N5 + NL. The tax liability is T*(Ns + NL),
and his marginal tax rate on additional long-term or short-term gains is T.
Region III differs from Region II in that net short-term gains are smaller than
net long-term losses, so the investor realizes a net loss. Since one-half of
net long-term losses may be deducted from ordinary income, the investor's tax
liability is .5T*(NS + N1)1 implying TS =TL
=.5T.Region IV depicts an in-
vestor who realized small net losses both long-term and short-term. His losses
enable him to reduce his taxable income by .5NL + N5, yielding a tax payment of
T*(.5NL + Ns). For this investor, TL =.5Tand =T.In both Regions III
and IV, the net loss included in taxable income must be less than $3,000.
Region V contains all the cases in which net losses exceed $3,000. In this
situation, the investor includes a $3,000 loss in ordinary income, and carries
forward the balance of the loss. Marginal changes in gain and loss realizations
have no effect on current tax liability, although they affect the size of
capital loss carryforwards. The marginal tax rate on marginal realizations
depends upon the date at which the investor fully utilizes his capital loss
carryforwards. If an investor expects to be in Region V forever, either because
his loss-carryforwards are very large or because he continually realizes
significant losses, then marginal tax rates on both short—term and long-term
gains are zero.6
Investors in Region VI realize net long—term gains and net short—term losses
but their short-term losses exceed long-term gains by less than $3,000. All netc
— 7-.
losses (NL +Ns)can therefore be included in taxable income, so =
TL
=T.
Finally,Region VII includes investors with realized net long-term gains and
short—term losses, but for whom NL +Ns
>0.Since net short-term losses offset
long-term gains dollar-for-dollar, the net gain included in taxable income is
.4*(NL +Ns).For investors in this region, T5= TL=
I.B.Portfolio Trading Rules
The difference between traditional analyses of the capital gains tax and the
"tax minimizing view" derives from their differential assumptions about trading
rules. The traditional analysis either fails to specify, or makes naive assump-
tions about, the trading rules used by investors. Studies suggesting important
"lock—in" effects often provide no explanation of why investors trade their
assets, but simply argue that trading will occur less frequently in tax regimes
with high realization-based tax rates. Empirical studies of the effective tax
rate such as Bailey (1969), King (1977), and Protopapadakis (1983) make the
analytically tractable assumption that investors hold their assets for a fixed
period, or assume that they face a constant probability each period of being
forced to liquidate their assets. If investors do not trade unless forced to
and asset returns are generated by a simple stochastic process, then it is
possible to calculate the expected present value of the taxes which will be paid
on a one dollar accrued capital gain. This tax rate is an increasing function
of the probability of forced trades.
If investors actually followed this trading strategy, the distribution of
investors across the various tax brackets in Figure 1 would depend principally
on the distribution of returns. Provided expected (nominal) pre-tax returns— 8-
were positive, the government would expect positive revenue from its capital
gains tax. An increase in marginal tax rates on ordinary income or a tightening
of the loss-offset constraints would raise revenue, and assuming no change in
pretax returns, lower the returns available to investors.
More sophisticated portfolio strategies from the tax standpoint are examined
by Constantinides (1983). He assumes that investors face periodic forced asset
sales, and takes the tax rates in Region I of Figure 1 as applying to forced
realizations. He also assumes that losses are never large enough to cause the
loss-offset constraint to bind, so that investors with losses face the tax rates
of Region VI.If capital markets are perfect and there are no transaction costs
or restrictions on wash sales, then the optimal trading rule is to (i) defer
short-term gains until they become long-term unless otherwise forced to realize;
(ii) realize losses when they occur7, (-iii) sell and repurchase long—term assets
whenever their price and tax basis are equal, and (iv) (possibly) sell assets
with accrued long-term gains to re-establish their short-term status and potent-
ial to generate short-term losses.8
When the differential between the tax rates on short- and long-term gains is
large enough, the government may actually lose revenue through its capital gains
tax provisions. Most losses will be realized short-term for large deductions,
while most gains will be realized long-term for smaller tax liability. Raising
both long- and short-term capital gains tax rates proportionately will increase
the rates at which losses may be deducted from ordinary income, and raise the
effective tax burden on forced realizations. If forced realizations are
infrequent, such a tax increase may actually reduce government revenues and
raise the after-tax return to risky holding risky assets.—9—
Constantinides' assumption that the loss—offset constraint does not bind
implies that investors could lower their taxes by realizing additional capital
losses. Both Allen (1982) and Stiglitz (1983) argue that investors can generate
tax losses at low cost and without exposing themselves to much risk and there-
fore reduce their tax liability until either (-I) the loss-offset provisions bind
or (ii) tax payments equal zero. By assuming perfect capital markets, unre-
stricted short sales, and no transactions costs, they exhibit a variety of zero-
net-worth investments which enable investors to realize capital losses while
deferring capital gains. Stiglitz (1983) suggests four particular strategies:
(i) the "locked in" strategy of postponing realization of long-term gains, (ii)
the "immediate realization" strategy of realizing all losses immediately, (iii)
the "indebtedness" strategy of borrowing to buy appreciating assets, and (iv)
the "loss—roll-over" strategy of buying and selling highly correlated securi-
ties. If there were no loss-offset limits, these strategies would permit
investors to avoid all taxes. With loss—offset constraints, investors must
transform ordinary income into capital gains before they offset it with losses.
This can be accomplished many ways: by shorting a dividend-paying stock around
its ex-dividend day, by purchasing assets with tax depreciation in excess of
their true economic depreciation, or by borrowing to purchase an appreciating
asset, for example.
An investor who follows the Allen-Stiglitz tax minimizing strategies will
either be in Region V of Figure I, or or he will have generated enough ordinary
losses to offset all ordinary income and pay no taxes. For these investors,
changes in statutory capital gains tax rates have no incentive effects. They
also have no effect on the government's tax receipts.—10—
The Allen-Stiglitz trading strategies may be difficult to implement for
several reasons. First, since they often require frequent trading, their value
is very sensitive to transaction costs. Deferring accrued gains on corporate
stock may require short sales which carry particularly high brokerage costs.9
Second, investors may be unable to realize gains or losses on particular assets
without affecting their portfolio risk. For assets with many close substitutes,
such common stocks, diversification issues may not arise. However, most capital
gains arise from assets other than common stock. Only 17 percent of net capital
gains in 1977, and 33 percent of those in 1981, were on corporate equities.
More than a third of all gains realized are on depreciable property and real
estate.1° It may be difficult and costly to discover close substitutes for these
assets. Finally, the transactions which generate the Allen—Stiglitz results may
attract IRS scrutiny of the investor's tax return and they are frequently the
target of loophole-closing tax reforms. For example, the 1984 changes in the
U.S. tax law have made it very difficult to generate losses from paper transac-
tions in the securities market.11
Since the Allen—Stiglitz "tax-minimizing" view makes the strong prediction
that tax-paying investors should be found only in Region V1 it can be tested
easily. The modified tax—minimizing view of Constantinides, and the traditional
constant sale probability model, make less precise predictions with respect to
the distribution of marginal tax rates on realized gains. The long average
holding periods for most assets, however, suggest that the pressure of forced
realizations during the six month short-term holding period should be quite
small.12 Constantinides' model therefore would also imply a high concentration
of investors with significant taxable losses in Region VI.—11—
The next section tests these predictions by studying the actual distribu-
tion of tax rates on realized gains. There is undoubtedly a great deal of
heterogeneity in the way investors manage their portfolios, and each of the
portfolio strategies outlined above probably describes some part of the invest-
ing population. My empirical analysis is designed to provide evidence on the
importance of tax-minimizing investors, by comparing the observed behavior of
investors who realize capital gains with the predictions of the tax-minimizing
view.—12—
II. The Realization of Gains and Losses
The tax minimization view makes two prechctions regarding the realization
of gains and losses. First, a substantial fraction of investors should be
observed at or near the capital gain loss-offset constraints. Second, investors
should realize offsetting gains and losses. Investors should never realize and
pay taxes on large capital gains, since they could have sheltered these gains
with paper losses. This section uses data on reported capital gains and tax
status, drawn from the U.S. Treasury's Tax Model Data file for 1982, to test
these predictions. The data set contains a sample of 89,127 individual federal
income tax returns. It oversamples high—income returns, and includes all
returns with adjusted gross income in excess of $400,000.
I first examine the distribution of investors across the seven tax regions
in Figure 1. Table 1 reports three different tabulations of investor tax
rates.13 The first column, which assigns each tax return in the sample a weight
based on its sampling proportion, describes the fraction of tax returns in each
category. The second column weights each return by the product of its sampling
weight and its reported dividend income, as a proxy for the taxpayer's total
wealth and importance as a stock market investor. This column shows the
fraction of total dividends received by investors in each tax region. The third
column weights observations by sampling weights, as in the first column, but is
restricted to returns with adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000.
The results demonstrate that many investors realize only gains and therefore
face the tax rates of Region I. Over sixty percent of the investors with gains
or losses realized only gains. Slightly more than fifty percent of the divi-
dends received by the household sector accrued to investors in this region, who—13—







































Source: Author's tabulations based on 1982 U.S. Treasury Tax Model Data file.
Further explanation of. the regions and corresponding tax rates,TL and












do not behave as the "tax minimization" model predicts.
A sizable group of investors do behave in ways consistent with the model,
however. Eleven percent of the investors who received gains or losses faced a
binding loss-offset constraint. Nearly nineteen percent of household dividends
were received by investors in this group. This may understate the importance of
these investors in the equity market if those persons who minimize their capital
gains tax liability by following sophisticated trading strategies also hold
low-yield common stocks to avoid dividend taxation.
Fifty three percent of the investors who were in Region V in 1982 had also
been constrained by the loss—offset rules in 1981. For a sizable group of
taxpayers, therefore, the binding loss-offset constraint is not a transient
condition. The current data set cannot reveal the complete distribution of
loss-constrained spells, since it only enables us to compare two consecutive
years. An important issue which should be explored if longer panels of tax
returns with capital gains information became available is the persistence of
loss-constraint. This information is essential for assessing the effective tax
burdens on investors in Region V.
Table 2 reports a more detailed calculation of the fraction of tax returns
for which the loss-offset provisions are binding or nearly binding. It disagg-
regates taxpayers into groups based on adjusted gross income (AGI), and presents
three sets of calculations corresponding to the weighting schemes in Table 1.
The results show that although the probability that the loss—offset constraint
will bind or nearly bind is low (.015) for the taxpaying population at large, it
increases with AGI and reaches .12 for returns with AGI in excess of $100,000.
The most striking result is that nearly one quarter of the dividends reported on—15--
Table 2: Constraints on Capital Loss Offsets to Ordinary Income, 1982
Fraction of Returns Fraction of Returns
Adjusted Gross Income with Capital Losses with Capital Losses
Category Greater Than Limit Greater Than .50*Limit
All Returns
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Source: Author's tabulations using a one-in three sample from the 1982 U.S. Treasury
Individual Tax Model Data File.—16—
returns with gains or losses, or sixteen percent of dividends reported on all
individual tax returns, are on returns with net losses of more than half the
loss—offset limit. Nearly seventeen percent of dividends accruing to households
with more than $100,000 in AGI are on returns for which the constraint binds.
My analysis of the fraction of investors for whom additional capital gains
generate no additional current tax liability closely parallels Feenberg's (1981)
study of dividend income.14 He found that almost no taxpayers were bound by the
interest deductibility constraints which make additional dividend income effec-
tively untaxed. His results are confirmed in my 1982 data, where 1.7 percent of
all taxpayers have interest deductions within $1000 of this constraint. Both
the loss—offset constraint and the interest deductibility constraint, were
binding for only .09 percent of the taxpayers in the sample, and 2.9 percent for
those with AGI of $100,000 or more. This finding suggests that few investors
simultaneously face zero tax rates on both dividends and capital gains, and it
does not suggest that there is a single group of "tax-minimizing" investors who
sucessfully avoid taxation on all forms of capital income.
The calculations in Table 2 group all types of assets together, because
the Treasury Tax Model does not provide information on individual asset trans-
actions. For many purposes, however, such as analyzing the effect of capital
gains taxation on the intersectoral allocation of capital, it is important to
know effective tax burdens by asset type. Some disaggregated calculations can
be made using the 1973 Survey of Capital Asset Sales. For 1973, eighty percent
of all gain-producing long-term transactions, and 87.2 percent of all gross
long-term gains, are reported on tax returns with net gains. Only 71 percent of
common stock transactions with gross gains fall into this category, although—17—
86.1 percent of all gross long-term gains on common stock are reported on
returns with net gains. For non-business real estate and depreciable property,
nearly ninety-five percent of all gains are reported on returns with net gains.
These tabulations suggest that gains on corporate equity tend to face lower tax
burdens, when realized, than gains on real assets.
The results from the 1982 Tax Model suggest that most capital gains are
reported by investors who realize only gains. This contradicts the tax-minimiz-
ing view's prediction that investors should realize offsetting gains and losses.
To explore the role of gain and loss offsetting in greater detail, Table 3 shows
the fraction of long term gross gains which were reported on returns with gross
losses which totally offset the gain. Only 2.7 percent of gross long-term
gains, and 23.1 percent of gross short-term gains, are reported on returns with
net capital losses. The table also shows the share of gross long—term gains
reported on returns with no long-term losses or short-term transactions of any
kind. They account for over half of all realized long-term gains, although only
one third of gains realized on returns with AOl of at least $100,000 fall into
this category.
Although most gains are reported on returns without losses, many losses are
reported on returns with net gains. For long-term losses, ninety three percent
of the reported losses are on returns with net gains. For short-term losses
this effect is less pronounced: only one third of the reported losses are on
net gain returns. Short-term losses on high-income returns, however, shelter
gains to a greater extent, since roughly two thirds of these losses are on
returns with net gains.
One difficulty with the tests in this section -is that the loss-offset—18—
Table 3: Offsetting of Capita) Gains and Losses, 1982
All Returns with
Returns AGI$100,000
Share of Gross Long-Term
Gains Reported on Returns
with:
-NoGross Losses or
Short-Term Gains .518 .319
-NetLoss .027 .011
Share of Gross Long-Term
Losses Reported on Returns
with:
-NoGross Gains or
Short-Term Losses 0 0
-NetGain .930 .978
Share of Gross Short-Term
Gains Reported on Returns
with:
-NoGross Losses or
Long-Term Gains .097 .020
-NetLoss .231 .112
Share of Gross Short-Term
Losses Reported on Returns
with:
-NoGross Gains or
Long-Term Losses .155 .040
-NetGain .337 .669
Source: Author's calculations based on 1982 U.S. Treasury Tax Model Data File.—19—
constraint might not be binding, even though an investor was following a tax-
minimizing trading strategy, because he might have borrowed enough to generate
interest payments larger than his other ordinary income. The borrowed funds
could be invested in appreciating assets, while the investor might not realize
any gains during a particular tax year. In this case, the tax return would show
no capital gains activity. An intermediate case obtains if investors borrow to
purchase capital assets and then sell them. The tax return would then show
interest deductions as well as reported capital gains. This can be studied
using the 1982 Tax Model data.
Thirty—six percent of all returns with gains or losses have interest
payments in excess of the net gain, as might be expected under the tax minimiza-
tion view. Excluding mortgage interest, the fraction falls to 27.5 percent.
At the other extreme, forty one percent of all returns with gains (but only 14.6
percent with net gains and AGI$100,000) report no interest payments.
The results in this section reflect the substantial heterogeneity of the
investing population. Although some investors behave as the Allen-Stiglitz
"tax-minimizing" model suggests they should, the majority of investors who
realize capital gains do not adopt sophisticated tax reduction strategies. Many
realized gains, therefore, are taxed at substantial marginal rates.—20-
111. The Timing of Realizations
The tax-minimizing model implies that capital losses should be realized as
soon as they occur to maximize the present value of loss-offsets, while capital
gains should be deferred at least until they become eligible for long-term gains
treatment. Previous studies of gains and losses reported on tax returns, such
as Fredlund, Gray and Sunley (1968) and Kaplan (1981), suggest some deferral
takes place. Unpublished IRS data reported by the New York Stock Exchange
(1982) show that in 1977, when transactions qualified for short—term treatment
if they lasted less than nine months, loss realizations were 108, 120, 163, 29,
94, and 256 on transactions of duration seven through twelve months, respec-
tively. These data suggest a sharp decline in loss realizations at nine months.
Gains show no decline before nine months and rise slightly after transactions
become eligible for long-term treatment. This section suggests that these data
may be unreliable and may overstate the importance of deferral.
There is relatively little information on realization patterns from sources
other than tax returns; one unique source of such evidence is Schiarbaum,
Lewellen, and Lease's (1978) study of all security transactions between 1964 and
1970 in a sample of 2500 accounts at a large retail brokerage house. Their
sample includes 75,123 round trip common stock transactions, and they tabulate
the fraction of round-trip transactions which result in positive realized
returns for different holding periods.15
Their findings are reproduced in the first column of Table 4. The probab-
ility of observing a negative gross return on a transaction with a duration of
less than six months is no different from that for transactions lasting more
than a year. The second and third columns in the table present calculations of—21—
Table 4: Corporate Stock Transactions with Reported Capital Gains,
by Holding Period
Percent of Reported Transactions which Show Net Gains
Tax Return Tabulations
Brokerage Tax Return Tabulations Weighted by Gain or Loss
Account
Holding PeriodTabulations 1962 1973 1962 1973
<1month 58 54 51 48 51
1-6 months 57 38 40 32 31
6—12 months 59 32 35 33 31
>12months 51 48 39 62 54
Source: Data in column one are from Schiarbaum, et al. (1978), p. 323. Tax return
tabulations are based on author's calculations from U.S. Treasury (1966,
Table 12) and (1980, Table 8). Statistics for transactions with holding
periods of more than twelve months may not be comparable between column 1
and subsequent columns. The value in the first column is based on a sample
of transactions which lasted at most seven years. The tax return
tabulations in later columns include all transactions with holding period
between one and ten years.—22—
gain and loss realizations based on the 1973 Survey of Capital Asset Sales. For
transactions with holding periods of one month or less, both the IRS tabulations
and the brokerage firm data suggest that just over half of all transactions
result in capital gains. Calculations weighting each transaction by the size of
the resulting gain or loss, shown in the last two columns, yield conclusions
similar to those based on simple transaction counts. The conformity between the
data sources vanishes at longer holding periods. The brokerage firm data
suggest that fifty-seven percent of transactions which last between one and six
months yield capital gains, while the IRS tabulations imply approximately forty
percent (thirty percent when value-weighted). The brokerage firm data suggest
that nearly sixty percent of all transactions of between six and twelve month
durations yield gains, while the IRS tabulations suggest about thirty percent.
A number of explanations might be proposed for the disagreement between
these two data sets. The first is that the tax return data are biased by
selective reporting of gains and losses. Investors may fail to report some
capital gains, while faithfully reporting capital losses. During the time
period covered by these data, there was no third party reporting system which
provided the IRS with data on capital asset transactions. Alternatively, they
may misclassify asset sales, erroneously (and perhaps deliberately) reporting
long-term losses as short-term. This is most consistent with the observed
pattern of gain and loss reports around the transition from short- to long-term
holding periods. Studies of taxpayer compliance reveal substantial underreport-
ing of capital gains tax liability, but do not disaggregate this into components
due to complete nonreporting of transactions versus misreporting. In future
work I hope to use unpublished IRS data to examine this issue.16—23—
Since short-term gain realizations face higher tax rates than long-term
gains, the incentive to avoid taxes through nonreporting is greater at short
than at long holding periods. This suggests a potentially significant bias in
previous attempts to show that asset trading distortions are caused by the
holding period distinction. If all loss transactions but only a fraction of
gain transactions are reported, or if the holding periods are misreported, and
the misreporting probability is a function of the holding period, then analyses
of tax return data may yield the spurious conclusion that gain-producing tran-
sactions are deferred. This finding could be purely an artifact of the selec-
tive sample provided by gains and losses reported to the tax authorities, and
may have contaminated all of the previous studies which have used IRS data to
show that investors are locked-in.
Tax avoidance is not the only possible explanation of the discrepancy
between the brokerage firm and IRS data. Another is that the divergences are
due to the different years covered by the two data sets. Both 1962 and 1973,
the years of the IRS surveys, were years in which few short term gains were
generated on common stock. One measure of the "realization potential" of a year
is the average value of the current Standard and Poor's Composite Index, divided
by its value six months earlier (similar results obtain for other holding
intervals). For 1962 and 1973, the average values of this ratio were .932 and
.965, respectively. For the period June 1964-December 1970, that covered by the
brokerage firm data, the corresponding average ratio was 1.008.
Other possibilities could also be suggested. The particular brokerage firm
which was surveyed might have provided its clients with particularly poor tax
advice. The client pool might be unrepresentative of investors in general, and—24—
there may be sample selection issues which arise because the investors are
followed over a long period, but Schiarbaum et al. address these issues and find
the characteristics of investors in their sample to closely resemble those for
investors in general.
If the explanation is non—reporting, however, it implies two things.
First, the distortions in asset trading patterns due to the capital gains tax
may be smaller than previously believed. Studies based on tax return data, such
as Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki (1980), may yield a misleading picture of
these distortions. Second, -in analyzing the burden of the capital gains tax, it
may be important to treat issues in tax evasion. Future theoretical and
empirical work should be directed at assessing this burden.—25—
IV. Realized Gains Versus Effective Tax Rates
The preceding sections ignore three important aspects of the taxation of
capital gains, all of which play a cental role in any attempt to estimate
effective marginal tax rates. First, a sizable fraction of realized capital
gains face a marginal tax rate of zero because they are never reported to the
Internal Revenue Service. The most recent estimates (Internal Revenue Service,
1983) show that in 1981, when $43.7 billion of taxable net capital gains should
have been reported on individual income tax returns, only $25.9 billion was
actually reported. This implies a nonreport-ing rate of 40.6 percent for capital
gains income, by comparison with 6.3 percent for wage and salary income, 16.3
percent for dividend income, and 13.7 percent for interest income. The only
significant income categories with comparable noncompliance rates are those for
partnerships and small businesses (53.0 percent nonreporting), nonfarm propriet-
or income (49.7 percent nonreporting), and informal supplier income (79.3 per-
cent nonreporting).17 The nonreporting rate should be reduced by the recent
introduction of third-party reporting for some gains, but a substantial share of
realized gains may continue to escape taxation.
The second aspect of capital gains taxation which my analysis omits is the
possibility of tax-reducing asset transfers. Many gains never face the taxes
described above because the investor transfers his assets or dies before
realizing the gain.If appreciated assets are bequeathed, their basis is
"stepped-up" to their market value, and all prior appreciation escapes taxation.
The Joint Tax Committee (1986) estimates that in 1986, the federal government
suffered a revenue loss of 4.4 billion dollars from basis step-up, compared to
22.2 billion from partially excluding long-term capital gains from income.—26—
Transferring appreciated assets to nontaxable institutions and minors also expo-
ses the gains to taxation at relatively low rates. Unfortunately, no estimates
of these flows are available.
Finally, by focussing on the tax rates which apply to realized gains, my
analysis ignores the lengthy time periods which often elapse between accrual and
realization of gains. To measure the effective tax burden on accruing gains,
it is essential to know when they will be realized for tax purposes. Some indi-
cation of the impact of deferral is suggested by data on stock market transac-
tions, drawn from the New York Stock Exchange (1984). In 1983, the share
turnover rate for individual investors implied that shares were held an average
of four years. For institutional investors, the average holding period was only
one year. The average holding periods for securities which appreciate while the
investor owns them may be even longer.Without a model of why investors trade,
however, it is difficult to model effective capital gains tax rates.—27—
V. Summary and Implications
This paper suggests that a significant fraction of realized capital gains
are taxed at non-zero marginal tax rates. The investors who realize these gains
are not following tax—minimizing portfolio strategies, and the capital gains tax
has the effect of lowering their after-tax return. Other investors, however,
follow trading strategies which make their effective tax rates on capital gains
very low. Investor heterogeneity is an important aspect of capital gains taxa-
tion, and it is extremely difficulty to aggregate across investors in different
tax positions to obtain an overall measure of how the capital gains tax affects
savings and investment incentives. The results suggest, however, that the
"traditional" analysis of the capital gains tax which assumed that realized
gains faced nontrivial marginal tax rates does apply to a sizable part of the
investing population.
These results suggest several directions for future research. Perhaps the
most important is explaining the evident divergence in investors' portfolio
behavior. Some investors follow tax-minimizing portfolio strategies, while
others do not. This heterogeneity may be due to differences in transaction
costs, information, or other exogenous factors which induce investors to buy or
trade securities.18 Investigating the sources of this heterogeneity will
facilitate better modelling of the distortions induced by capital gains
taxation. A second question raised by investor heterogeneity concerns the iden-
tity of the "marginal investors" who effectively determine asset prices and
hence the market's relative valuation of di)idends and capital gains. For both
tax—minimizers and individual investors who behave in an unsophisticated way
from the tax standpoint, capital gains are probably taxed more lightly than—28—
dividend -income. For other investors, however, principally corporations, the
tax rate on capital gains may be significantly higher than that on dividend
income. The resulting market equilibrium must depend on the relative wealths,
risk aversions, and trading costs of these different investor groups.
A third issue, which applies in studying a wider range of taxes, concerns
unreported income. For capital gains, nonreporting is a more serious problem
than for most other income sources. However, it is not clear that the effective
tax rate on the unreported component of capital gains is zero. Investors who
decide to evade their tax liability may suffer a reduction in their expected
utility as a consequence; at the margin, this should exactly equal their
expected utility from the after-tax income they would receive if they report
their income. The effective tax rate may therefore be equal on reported and
unreported gains. Resolving the tax burden on tax evaders may be particularly
important in measuring the distribution of effective capital gains tax rates
across asset types. Some assets, notably collectibles and some types of
tangible property, provide much greater opportunities for generating unreported
income than do other assets. This could affect the relative tax rates on these
assets, and have potentially important effects on the interasset allocation of
capital.—29—
Footnotes
1.Domar and Musgrave (1944), Stiglitz (1969), and more recently Balcer and
Judd (1985), Judd (1985), and Kovenock and Rothschild (1983, 1984) examine the
distortionary effects of the capital gains tax.
2. Bailey (1969), King and Fullerton (1984), and Protopapadakis (1983) estimate
effective capital gains tax rates on households. Their results suggest that .05
is a rough approximation to the household tax rate. Lindsey (1986) presents
recent evidence on the average marginal tax rate on realized gains over the
1965-1982 period; his data could be used to update the other calculations.
3.For a detailed discussion of several other provisions which affected the
taxation of capftal gains in years prior to 1978, see Lindsey (1986).
4. The definition of "short-term" has been changed numerous times. The
required holding period needed to qualify for long-term gains treatment was six
months prior to 1977 and nine months in 1978.
5. If assets are transferred as inter vivos gifts, the recipient inherits the
donor's tax base and remains subject to capital gains taxation on the accrued
gains, but the taxes are paid only when the recipient sells the asset. While
such gifts are less attractive than transfer at death for capital gains tax
purposes, they have the advantage of avoiding estate taxes.
6. If an investor is certain to exhaust his carryforwards in k years, then the
marginal tax rates on realized gains is -r =T÷kRkwhere r+k is the marginal
capital gains tax rate in period t+k, and Rk is the current price of risk-free
income in period t+k.
7. With perfect markets and no rules against wash sales, the investor does not
forego any investment opportunities by following this strategy. He can either
repurchase the security in which he realizes the loss, or buy a very close
substitute for it, immediately after the sale.
8.The desirability of voluntarily realizing long-term gains depends upon the
level of transactions costs, the differential between the short-term and
long-term capital gains tax rates, and the asset's own variance.
9. It is not uncommon for personal investors who take short positions to be
required to hold a balance half as large as their short position in a non-
interest bearing brokerage account. The foregone interest cost may swamp the
value of deferring capital gains taxation. Some other trading strategies may
involve so many transactions that the brokerage costs, even at low marginal
rates, become prohibitive; Constantinides and Scholes (1980) examine a case
where this may be true.
10.In 1981 (1977), 33.2 (17.3) of reported capital gains were on common
stock, 38.39 (33.0) were on nonbusiness real estate and other depreciable pro-—30—
perty, 9.0% (10.8%) were on sales of partnerships and fiduciaries, and
19.5% (37.7%) were on other assets. These data are drawn from Brame and Gilmour
(1982) and other unpublished IRS tabulations.
11. Wetzler (1984) presents a detailed discussion of the provisions in the 1984
Deficit Reduction Act which affected capital gains taxation.
12. The average holding period for noninstitutional investors trading on the New
York Stock Exchange was four years in 1983 (NYSE (1984)).
13. The 1982 Tax Model Data File reports net capital gains and losses to
four—significant-figure accuracy. For some returns with very large offsetting
gain and loss transactions it is therefore impossible to measure proximity to
the $3,000 limit accurately. To explore the importance of this problem, Table
1 was recalculated omitting any returns for which the net gain or loss could
not be determined to within one hundred dollars. (This excludes returns with
both offsetting gains and losses, and a gain or loss of more than one million
dollars). Only 0.11 percent of the returns with capital gains were excluded by
this rule, and the results were changed only in the third decimal place.
14. For a discussion of how constraints on interest deductability can make them
marginal dividend tax rate zero, see Miller and Scholes (1978). Peterson,
Peterson, and Ang (1985), as well as Feenberg, provide tax-return based evidence
against this view.
15. I first learned of these tabulations from Shefrin and Statman (1985).
16. Hinrichs (1964) calculated that 36 percent of equity capital gains are
never reported. His estimates are remarkably close to the total estimates of
unreported capital gains found by recent IRS surveys.
17. These estimates are based on detailed IRS audits which are part of the
Taxpayer Compliance Monitoring Program. Capital gains misreporting may take
three different forms: transactions may be completely reported, their basis may
be overstated, or their sale price may be understated. At present these are no
data on the relative importance of these different factors.
18. Balcer and Judd (1985) provide one example of directions for future work.
They explore the burden of the capital gains tax in a model where lifecycle
investment considerations are the source of trading activity.—31—
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